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NO FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
FOR WATER POLLUTION

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF
NUISANCE: The United States Supreme Court held that the 1972
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempted
federal common law of nuisance claims. City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois,
101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
INTRODUCTION

In a dispute between the State of Illinois and the City of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, the Supreme Court, in 1972, proclaimed a "federal common
law of nuisance" action for alleged discharges of inadequately treated or
untreated sewage into Lake Michigan.' In April 1981, the Supreme Court
terminated this common law in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (hereinafter
Milwaukee II),2 a suit involving the same dispute between the same
parties.
The dispute originated in the city of Milwaukee. The city, the Sewerage
Commission of the City of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan Sewerage
Commission of the County of Milwaukee (hereinafter Milwaukee), construct, operate, and maintain a series of sewer systems and two sewerage
treatment plants.' The sewer systems are of two types: combined and
separated. The combined systems collect both sewage and storm water
runoff while the separated systems carry only sewage for treatment. 4
During periods of wet weather both systems are likely to overflow, although the combined systems are more susceptible to overflow because
they collect the storm water runoff. Mechanical or "gravity overflow"
devices discharge the overflow (which includes untreated sewage) into
1. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
2. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
3. These facilities serve Milwaukee County, an area of 420 square miles with a population of
over 1,000,000 people. Id. at 1787.
4. There are 18 bypass points and 31 overflow points on the Metropolitan (or Main) Interceptor
System, which is the network of sanitary sewers in the Milwaukee Metropolitan area that carries
sewage to the Jones Island and South Shore treatment plants. Sewage generated in the 26 municipalities within the area first flows into a "lateral sewer" and from there into "local collector sewers,"
which connect with the Metropolitan Interceptor System. There are 78 overflow points (called "crossovers") on Milwaukee's sanitary sewer system and 112 overflow points on the city's combination
storm water and sanitary sewer system. In a single month in 1976, the untreated sewage discharged
from just 11 of the 239 overflow points totalled 646.46 million gallons. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
599 F.2d 151, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1979).
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Lake Michigan or tributaries leading into Lake Michigan. These discharges occur at identifiable points throughout the system.
The State of Illinois (hereinafter Illinois) complained that these overflow discharges along with inadequately treated sewage from Milwaukee's
two treatment plants had become a health threat to Illinois' citizens.
Disease causing bacteria, 5 discharged with the overflows and inadequately
treated sewage into the Lake, travel by lake currents into Illinois' waters. 6
Illinois also complained that the sewage accelerates the eutrophication of
the lake. 7
In 1972, Illinois petitioned for leave to file an action under the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction8 against Milwaukee. 9 Illinois requested that
the Court compel Milwaukee to abate the nuisance. The unanimous Court
declined to exercise its jurisdiction because: (1)this was not an action
"between two or more states"; (2) an appropriate federal district court
could provide an alternative forum for deciding the federal questions; and
(3) the issue of a state-created public nuisance affecting another state was
a federal question" which, in the absence of a specific substantive statutory remedy," required resolution by applying the federal common law
of nuisance.' 2 The Court stated that the various federal environmental
statutes were not the exclusive remedies, although they might provide
useful guidelines for shaping the common law.
The 1972 decision, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (hereinafter Milwaukee
I), preceded enactment of the 1972's and 1977'4 amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.' 5 The Court warned that "new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field of
5. The sewage of a city as large as Milwaukee inevitably contains enteroviruses. Enteroviruses,
sometimes referred to as enteric viruses, inhabit the gastroenteric tract of human beings. Many of
these viruses are pathogenic, causing diseases such as polio, pleurodynia, myocarditis, meningitis,
and encephalitis. Id. at 167.
6. Lake Michigan is the sixth largest lake in the world. It borders northeastern Illinois; most
notably: the city of Chicago.
7. Eutrophication is the natural aging of a lake caused by a decrease of nutrients. This process
can be accelerated by the nutrients in sewage. 599 F.2d 151, 169 n. 39 (7th Cir. 1979).
8. In Article 111,
§ 2, cl.2 of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court is granted
original jurisdiction of all cases in which a state is a party. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976),
the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies between two or
more states, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976), but only original jurisdiction of actions between a state
and a citizen of another state, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1976).
9. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
10. 406 U.S. 91, 98-101 (1972).
II. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1511, 1160 (1970), does not create
the specific remedy for abatement of interstate water pollution. The Rivers and Harbors Act of March
3, 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§401, 407 (1976), specifically exempts sewage from its control.
12. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
14. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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federal common law of nuisance."' 6 Shortly after the 1972 decision,
Illinois sued Milwaukee in United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois' 7 under federal common law to abate the alleged public
nuisance.
BACKGROUND
Federal Common Law
Federal courts resort to federal common law when state common law
is deemed inappropriate. State common law may be inappropriate when,
among other reasons, the dispute is between states, the issues in the case
relate to federal statutes or policies, or the case involves issues of international law. 8
When fashioning federal common law, federal courts rely on several
sources, which include: relevant federal decisions, 9 federal statutes, fed2' If the federal common
eral regulations, federal policies, 2" and state law.
22
law.
state
the
absorb
will
it
law is conclusive,
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,23 the Supreme Court, in 1938, sought
to limit the application of federal common law. The Court stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern. There is no federal general common law. 24 (Emphasis added.)
As a result of Erie, the federal courts have generally been precluded from
developing a body of common law. The Supreme Court has, however,
acknowledged that some issues may still be resolved by federal common
law.25 In an opinion delivered on the same day as Erie and written by
Justice Brandeis, the author of the majority opinion in Erie, the Court
16. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
17. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
18. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum.
L. Rev. 1024 (1967).
19. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1942).
20. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
21. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
22. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Id. at 78.
25. The Court has held that in certain situations even though the Erie rule would require application
of state law, federal courts should follow practices under federal law. E.g., Hanna v. Plummer, 380
U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965) (service of process governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather
than by state law); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-38 (1958)
(affirmative federal policy favoring jury trials overrode state policy that the judge be the factfinder).
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applied federal common law for the apportionment of interstate waters.2 6
The number and scope of such substantive27 areas in which federal common
law has developed have grown steadily.
Nuisance Law
The common law of nuisance is subdivided into private and public
nuisance. A private nuisance affects a determinate number of persons and
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land. 28 A public nuisance affects
citizens generally and wrongfully interferes with the legal rights and
privileges of the public. It does not necessarily involve interference with
the use and enjoyment of land. 9 Public authorities usually bring lawsuits
to abate public nuisances.
An alleged interference must be substantial and unreasonable to establish either a public or private nuisance. In determining whether an interference is substantial and unreasonable, courts consider such factors as:
locale or character of the neighborhood, the social utility of the activity,
the gravity of the harm, and the hardship which may result from any
judgment.3 °
FederalWater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
Five months after Illinois filed its action in district court, Congress
enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 31
The 1972 amendments (hereinafter FWPCA) substantially altered the
statute, supplementing the water quality criteria of the prior statute with
direct discharge limitations and providing for stronger sanctions and enforcement procedures for deterring violations. To achieve its stated goal
of eventual elimination of all pollutants3 2 in navigable waters,33 Congress
created a permit system administered by the EPA or an approved state
agency." 4 The permit system regulates all point sources.35 In addition, all
26. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
27. See generally Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (commercial paper);
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (labor law).
28. City of Newport News v. Hertzler, 216 Va. 587, 592, 221 S.E.2d. 146, 150 (1976).
29. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 458-59, 347 A.2d. 290, 303 (1975).
30. Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1123 (7th Cir. 1976).
31. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
32. "Pollutant" is defined as: ". . . dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munition, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." Id. § 1362(6) (Supp. III 1979).
33. "The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas." Id. § 1362(7).
34. This system replaced the permit system formerly administered by the Army Corps of Engineers
under the Harbors and Rivers Act of 1899. Id. §407 (1976). Under the FWPCA permit system, the
state agency must notify the EPA when it issues a permit.
35. "Point Source" is defined as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, . . . from
which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14) (Supp. III 1979).
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point sources, presumably including publicly owned treatment works such
as the one operated by the City of Milwaukee, must comply with "any
more stringent limitation . . . established pursuant to any State law or
regulations or any other Federal law or regulation . . . "36 Any discharges
not in compliance with a permit are declared unlawful.37
If, under the permit, the waters of another state "may be affected,"
the state agency must notify the other state and allow the state the opportunity to submit written recommendations concerning the content of
the permit. The EPA must respond in writing if the recommendations are
not adopted."
The EPA has the authority to veto a proposed permit when another
state's waters may be affected. 39 The legislative history indicates that the
veto must be based on the issuing state's failure to require limitations
sufficient to assure compliance with applicable effluent limitations, either
those imposed under the FWPCA by EPA, or those imposed by the
affected state.4"
With respect to the substantially modified enforcement procedures, the
Administrator of the EPA has several options if he learns "on the basis
of any information available to him" that a discharger is in violation of
the Act, including the conditions contained in a state-issued discharge
permit. He may issue an order requiring such person to comply, commence
a civil action for appropriate relief in federal district court, or notify the
appropriate state agency of the violation. 4 If the state agency fails to
take action to assure compliance, the Administrator must do so. 42
Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1977
The 1977 amendments modified the FWPCA extensively. An important
change requires that when EPA objects to the issuance of a permit, it
must state "the reasons for such objection and the effluent limitations and
conditions which such permit would include if it were issued by the
Administrator. 43
The 1977 amendments also provided a more effective procedure for
ensuring state compliance.' When the EPA objects to the issuance of a
36. Id. § 1370.
37. Id. § 1311 (a).
38. Id. § 1342(b)(3)(6).
39. Id. § 1342(d)(2)(A), (b)(5).
40. The Administrator's general veto authority is expressly limited to cases in which the minimum
limitations imposed under the Act are violated. Id. §402(d)(2)(B).
For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the veto provisions see Save the Bay v.
Administrator of EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1284-87 (5th Cir. 1977); Mianus River Preservation Comm.
v. Administrator of EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 906-09 (2d Cir. 1976).
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(1), (3), (b) (Supp. 1111979).
42. ld. § 1319(a)(1)(3).
43. Id. § 1342(d)(2)(B).
44. Id. § 1342(d)(4).
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permit by a state agency, the issuing state is entitled to a public hearing
on the objection. If the state either fails to request a hearing within 90
days or fails to submit a revised permit meeting the objection, then EPA
may issue a permit itself "in accordance with the guidelines and requirements" of the Act. 45
Of significance for Milwaukee H, Congress, in the 1977 amendments,
directed the EPA to conduct a study and report to Congress on "the status
46
of combined sewer overflows in municipal treatment works operations. "
A purpose of the report is to determine whether new legislation to address
the problem is needed.47
CITY OF MILWAUKEE V. ILLINOIS
ProceduralSetting
Milwaukee, in conformance with the FWPCA, obtained permits for
its sewage discharges. It was unable, however, to comply with the permit
requirements, and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources brought
an enforcement action in Wisconsin state court pursuant to Section 402
of the FWPCA. On May 25, 1977, the state court issued a judgment and
set a timetable within which Milwaukee was required to comply with its
permits.
Meanwhile, Illinois proceeded in its action against Milwaukee in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The suit
eventually culminated in a ruling based on the federal common law of
nuisance. The district court rejected Milwaukee's claim that the FWPCA
preempted the federal common law, found that Milwaukee's discharges
did create a nuisance, ordered Milwaukee to cease discharging raw sewage
into Lake Michigan, and required Milwaukee to treat sewage in compliance with effluent standards more stringent than the minimum requirements of the FWPCA.48
Milwaukee appealed the district court's ruling to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. In partly affirming the lower court, the Seventh
Circuit held that the FWPCA had not preempted common law nuisance.
The court upheld the order to eliminate all overflows of raw sewage and
the construction schedule to achieve that goal. It reversed, however, the
lower court's imposition of stricter effluent limitations on treated sewage
than those required by the permits and EPA regulations.49
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. § 1374(c).
Id.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1979).
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United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority,5" reversed the lower federal courts and overruled the 1972 decision in Milwaukee ." The Court held that the comprehensive regulatory scheme
established by the 1972 FWPCA amendments5 2 precludes a federal common law nuisance action seeking to impose more stringent effluent treatment levels and overflow controls on a municipal sewage treatment plant
than required by the FWPCA regulations.
The Court began with the proposition that the "enactment of a federal
rule in an area of national concern ... is generally made not by the
federal judiciary . . . but by . . .Congress." 53 It stated that development
of federal common law has been necessary when Congress has not addressed a particular issue. When Congress addresses a question previously
governed by a decision based on federal common law,54 however, the
need for such an "unusual exercise" of lawmaking by federal courts
disappears. 5 The Court, relying on dicta from Milwaukee 1, restated the
warning made in its 1972 decision: "New federal laws and new federal
regulations may in time preempt the field of federal common law of
nuisance." 56
The Court specifically noted that the FWPCA amendments of 1972
were a total restructuring and complete rewriting of existing water pollution legislation. 7 Further, it emphasized that federal courts could not
50. The majority was comprised of six Justices, the dissent, three.
51. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
52. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
53. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1790 (1981).
54. In analyzing the two specific problems in the controversy, effluent limitations for discharges
from treatment plants and sewer overflows, the Court said the intent of Congress to supplant federal
common law was clearest with the effluent limitations. It reached this conclusion because specific
effluent limitations had been established by EPA pursuant to the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp.
1II 1979). Joint App. 371-94, 395-424; see 40 C.F.R. § 133.102. And in this case, Milwaukee
discharges treated sewage from its two plants under permits which incorporate the effluent limitations
established by the EPA regulations.
Although sewer overflows are regulated on a case by case basis rather than by established general
limitations, the Court answered that that was due to the difference in the nature of the problem and
not the extent to which it was addressed. Disagreement with the regulatory approach adopted by
the agency is no basis for creation of federal common law. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1794 (1981).
Yet, because overflows are regulated on a case-by-case basis, there may be little chance of achieving
the uniformity Justice Rehniquist argued was the result when eliminating the case-by-case determination of federal common law. The Court may, however, have spoken to that problem when they
said that the technical problems of water pollution are better left to an expert agency. Therefore,
one agency, the EPA, would govern the case-by-case determination rather than many federal courts.
55. 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1791 (1981).
56. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1979).
57. 1SEN. COMM.ON PUB. WORKS,93d CONG. IST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 350-51 (1973) (hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) (remarks of Chairman Blatnik of the House Committee which
drafted House version of the amendments).

448
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impose more stringent standards because Congress expressly delegated
standard setting to the EPA, 8 the agency with the expertise necessary for
such determinations. 9
Turning to the legislative history, the majority concluded that Congress
intended to establish an all-encompassing program which superceded any
federal common law developed to abate water pollution. The Court placed
heavy emphasis on the use of the word "comprehensive" in the legislative
history as evidence of congressional intent to occupy the field and supplant
any federal common law.6"
In addition, the Court emphasized that a major reason for the recognition of federal common law in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, the lack
of a forum in which Illinois could bring suit, 6 had been addressed by
the 1972 amendments.62 The Court focused on the input affected states
now have in the permit granting procedure as a result of the 1972 amendments. States affected by the grant of a permit must receive notice and
have an opportunity to participate in a public hearing.63 These states may
submit written recommendations and must receive notice if their recommendations are not accepted. 64 The EPA may also veto any permit
issued by a state when other states are affected.65 Implying that this "notice
and comment" procedure was the equivalent of a forum for suit, the Court
pointed out that Illinois did not take part in any of these administrative
proceedings. Once the permittees fully comply with the administrative
proceedings and then rely on the permits for their plans and operations,
it would be unfair for a federal court to "write their own ticket under the
guise of federal common law." 66
58. Equally consistent with this interpretation is that the EPA has relied on federal common law
of nuisance to supplant its own remedies. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1808 n. 22 (1981). The dissent argued
that EPA's interpretation should be a substitute for congressional silence. The majority agreed that
EPA's regulations for effluent limitations should be given deference. Id. at 1796.
59. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1794 (1981).
60. The majority relies on the following statement by Rep. Mizell: "The 'major purpose' of the
amendments was to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution." S. REP. NO. 92-414, p. 95, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 369 (1973). Senator
Randolph, Chairman of the responsible committee in the Senate, stated that "It is perhaps the most
comprehensive legislation that the Congress of the United States has ever developed in this particular
field of the environment." 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1269. 101 S. Ct. 1788, 1793 (1981).
61. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Supreme Court refused to exercise
its original jurisdiction because the controversy was not between two states. See discussion supra
note 8.
62. Before that case, the Court had not indicated that federal common law of nuisance provided
a basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (Supp. 1111979).
64. Id. § 1342(b)(5).
65. Id. § 1342(d)(2)(A).
66. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (1981).

April 1982]

NUISANCE FOR WATER POLLUTION

The Court found that sections 510 and 510(e) of the FWPCA did not
express a congressional intent to preserve the federal common law remedy
recognized in Milwaukee L67 Section 505(e) provides:

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or
class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a state
agency) .68

The Court said:
The subsection is common language accompanying citizen suit provisions and we think that it means only that the provision of such
suit does not revoke other remedies. It most assuredly cannot be read
to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant formerly available
federal common law actions but only that the particular section authorizing citizen suits does not do so.69
The dissent, written by Justice Blackmun, notes that every federal
court that considered the FWPCA has concluded that Congress intended
to preserve federal as well as state common law.7" Justice Blackmun
criticized the majority for construing Section 505(e) as a license to supplant all legal remedies outside the FWPCA. He interpreted Section 505(e)
as preventing pre-existing rights of action from being subjected to the
procedural and jurisdictional limitations in this citizen suit section of the
FWPCA. 7 Justice Blackmun found support for his position in the Senate
Report accompanying the Act which describes the congressional intent
behind Section 505(e):
It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically
preserve any rights or remedies under any other law ...

Compliance

with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common
law action for pollution damages.72
He noted that the report makes no distinction between federal and state
law.
67. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1370, 1365(e) (Supp. III 1979).
68. Id. § 1365(e).
69. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1798 (1981).
70. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215,
1218-20 (Mont. 1979); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556,
559 (N.D. I11. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149 (Vt.
1972), affd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
71. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1805 (1981).
72. S. REP. NO. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1499 (1973).
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The legislative debates, especially the comments on Reserve Mining
Co. v. EPA,73 address common law nuisance in pending lawsuits. Senators
Muskie74 and Hart commented that the Reserve Mining suit, which was
based in part on the federal common law of nuisance, would not be
affected or hindered by the new amendments. In a letter to Senator Griffin
concerning the effect of the amendments on pending legislation, the EPA
General Counsel said that "the courts will not interpret any legislation
to deprive them of jurisdiction . ..in the absence of clear and explicit
language." 7"
Justice Blackmun raised a number of other points in criticizing the
majority's reasoning. He thought it unlikely that Congress was unaware
of Illinois' reliance on the federal common law of nuisance in the Milwaukee I district court decision six months prior to the passage of the
FWPCA amendments of 1972. Thus, he doubted that Congress intended
to make Illinois' "nine year judicial exercise a charade." 7 6 Furthermore,
Congress had addressed water pollution as far back as 1899" and in a
broad and systematic fashion in 1948.78 The comprehensiveness of this
legislation, he pointed out, did not preclude the Supreme Court from
finding a federal common law of nuisance in 1972. Consequently, Justice
Blackmun found no reason why the 1972 amendments should be treated
any differently without specific congressional directive to do so.
In answer to the majority's discussion of Illinois' failure to participate
in the new administrative permit proceedings, Justice Blackmun found
such participation only voluntary, not mandatory. Blackmun contended
that Congress did not intend a failure to participate in the Section 402
administrative process to serve as a jurisdictional barrier to Illinois' suit.
The Conference Committee that considered the 1977 amendments was
presented with a proposition that would have made such participation
mandatory. 79 The proposition was not adopted.80 Justice Blackmun found
this conclusive evidence that Section 402 is not the exclusive forum for
relief.
73. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
74. The dissent notes that Senator Muskie was perhaps the FWPCA's primary author.
75. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 193 (1973).
76. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1800 (1981).
77. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§401-426 (1970).
78. Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
79. Congressman Aspin, concerned over the district court's decision in this case, proposed an
amendment to §402 that would have made it mandatory for a state to participate in the permitting
process. Failure to participate would have barred a state from bringing a nuisance action. 101 S.
Ct. 1784, 1806 (1981).
80. One opponent, the Department of Justice, sent a letter to members of the committee stating
that without such an amendment, common law would continue to exist. Letter to Senator Muskie
from James Moorman, Asst. Atty. General, Land and Natural Resource Division, October 18, 1977.
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ANALYSIS
II do not square with the federal
Court's
assertions
in
Milwaukee
The
legislation that existed when Milwaukee I was decided in 1972. When
Milwaukee I formally recognized the federal common law of nuisance
for water pollution, Congress had addressed the problem of water pollution since 1899.8 In Milwaukee I, Justice Douglas traced the history
of federal water pollution statutes.8 2 He suggested that the legislative
record evidenced a strong federal interest in water pollution, thus making
the federal common law of nuisance an appropriate remedy. An alternative
interpretation of this legal history is that federal courts can justifiably
fashion common law in a case where federal legislation is pervasive.
Despite the long standing substantial legislation concerning water pollution control, the majority placed heavy emphasis on the word "comprehensive" in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to conclude
that the FWPCA was a complete statute which excluded any remedies
not specifically enumerated in the statute. When Milwaukee I was decided,
however, Congress8 3had also characterized its then existing legislation as
"comprehensive."
This suggests that the Supreme Court may have
attached too much significance to the term "comprehensive" in the
amendments. The term may not have indicated a change in Congress's
view towards federal common law remedies. The 1977 amendments to
the FWPCA directed the EPA to conduct a study on sewer overflows to
determine if new legislation was needed. This suggests that the legislative
scheme is not as complete as the Court characterized it.
Another aspect of the FWPCA makes its comprehensiveness questionable. The Court said Congress "has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency." 84 The EPA does not, however, have exclusive authority for setting effluent limitations. The FWPCA authorizes
shared regulation between the federal government and the individual
states. In conjunction with their shared responsibility, states may impose
more stringent effluent limitations, 85 making the legislative scheme subject
to alteration. Although this standard setting is not executed by the EPA, 86
81. The Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-426 (1976).
82. 406 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1979).
83. See S. Rep. No. 462, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 8195 (1948) ("The purpose
of the bill (S. 418) is to provide a comprehensive program for preventing, abating and controlling
water pollution ..."). ("The bill provides that the Surgeon General shall encourage a comprehensive
program for the control of stream pollution between the States to secure their cooperation in combatting this evil.") 101 S.Ct. at 1805 n. 13.
84. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792 (1981).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1111979).
86. If a state does not have an EPA approved permit issuing program in compliance with § 1342(b),
the EPA will issue permits in that state.
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the state approved agency is arguably better qualified at regulating water
pollution than the federal courts,87 supporting the majority's contention
that the courts lack the expertise needed for consistent rulings.
The Court thoroughly discussed Wisconsin's compliance with the FWPCA
in the issuance of Milwaukee's permits. 88 Apparently, the Court found it
difficult to impose additional requirements on Milwaukee after permits
had been issued, and reliance and planning had been induced by those
permits.
The Court's focus on Illinois' lack of participation in the permit issuing
process suggests the Court believed it would be unfair to now allow
Illinois a remedy when it had not participated in the statutory process.
The problem with finding that Illinois was not dilatory is that the new
statutory notice and hearing provision became available two years after
Illinois commenced this action. As far as any unfairness as a justification
for the Court's result, Illinois clearly believed it had a cause of action
for abatement of nuisance as a result of the Supreme Court's 1972 ruling
channels
in Milwaukee I. Moreover, Illinois had pursued administrative
89
for abatement under the applicable statute at that time.
In addition to the clear intent of the Supreme Court to limit the application of federal common law where Congress has not explicitly approved it, the Court now indicates that even when Congress includes an
apparent reservation of common law rights in a statute, as with Section
505(e), the Court may apply a limited interpretation to such reservation.
Any language purporting to preserve a common law right or remedy
evidently now will have to be explicit. The implications of this analysis
are particularly important because Section 505(e) is virtually identical to
provisions found in other environmental statutes. 90
CONCLUSION
Lower federal courts will likely continue to hear the message of Milwaukee H. 91 Federal common law remedies for environmental torts will
87. The requirements a state must meet to qualify as a permit issuer are contained in § 1342(b).
88. 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1794-97 (1981).
89. Brief of respondent Illinois 8-9 (describing unsuccessful pursuit of administrative remedies);
cited from 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1806 n. 18 (1981).
90. See Section 304 (e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Supp. 11 1978); Section
7002(f) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1976); Section 1449(e) of the Safe
Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3000) -8(e) (1976); Section 520(e) of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(e) (1976); and Section 20(c)(3) of the Toxic
Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(3) (1976).
91. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (N.J. 1981) (even if the issue was appropriate for
federal common law of nuisance, any such common law has been preempted by the enactment of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act); Illinois v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 79-C-5406, slip
op. (N.D. 111.July 20, 1981) (dismissal of federal common law nuisance claim under Rivers and
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not be available if Congress has legislated a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for a particular subject area. The Supreme Court has since reaffirmed this message and laid to rest any thoughts that the Milwaukee
H decision was an aberration. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. NationalSea Clammers Association,92 plaintiffs brought suit in District
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that ocean dumping of
sludge and other wastes harmed their fishing grounds. Plaintiffs sued on
both federal common law and statutory grounds. The statutory grounds
were derived from the FWPCA and the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (hereinafter MPRSA).93 Citing Milwaukee H,
the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs had no federal common law
remedy. The Court noted that NPRSA is no less comprehensive with
respect to ocean dumping, than the FWPCA is with respect to other water
pollution. The Supreme Court will probably not view other pertinent
federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act94 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 95 as less comprehensive than the FWPCA. Thus,
it appears that other than the remedies provided in each of these statutory
schemes, an injured party apparently has no remedies at federal common
law and has to resort to state nuisance law. 96
With federal courts applying state nuisance law, even less uniformity
is likely to result than when federal common law of nuisance was applied.
Uniformity was one reason the majority in Milwaukee I gave for retiring
the federal common law of nuisance. Justice Blackmun argued the majority ignored the importance of federal common law in fulfilling federal
policies, saying that every federal law is inevitably incomplete. 97 Federal
common law has long filled gaps in a pervasive federal statutory framework when the "interstate nature of the controversy renders inappropriate
the law of either state."' 98 Note, however, that the federal circuit courts
were not uniform in their application of the federal common law of
Harbors Act). However, in New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, No. 76-6202, slip op. (2d
Cir. Aug. 24, 1981), the Court said the Clean Air Act differs substantially from the Water Pollution
Control Act in areas which the majority of the Court in City of Milwaukee found were especially
significant. The Court in New England Legal Foundation said it would leave for a more appropriate
case the question of whether all federal common law nuisance actions involving the emission of
chemical pollutants into the air are precluded by the statutory scheme set forth in the Clean Air Act.
92. 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
93. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1976)).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2629 (1976).
96. In Scott v. City of Indiana, 519 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the Court said the Supreme
Court has not definitely resolved the issue of whether state common law of nuisance survived the
demise of the federal common law of nuisance. Therefore, state law is held not preempted under
the FWPCA.
97. 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1808 (1981).
98. Id. at1801.
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nuisance since its formal recognition in 1972. 9' The question of whether
compliance with a FWPCA permit is a bar to a state common law of
nuisance claim is likely to be an area of contention in future environmental
litigation as a result of the decision in Milwaukee II.
NANCY R. LONG

99. ". . . many circuits require an extra-territorial effect for the application of federal common
law nuisance as an independent source of substantive environmental standards. On the other hand,
the Seventh Circuit will apply federal nuisance law regardless of interstate impact whenever the
defendant's activity 'is causing an injury or significant threat of injury to some cognizable interest
of the complainant.' " Fort, The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law Nuisance, 12 LOY.
U. L. J. 131 (1981).

